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Non-technical Summary
The analysis of business cycle synchronisation has recently gained importance, mainly due
to the ongoing discussion on the enlargement of the European Union. Theory appreciates
synchronised business cycles as an important prerequisite for the well-functioning of a com-
mon currency area. However, it is rather unclear which economic or political adjustments
result in higher synchronisation, and which design the adjustments should exhibit. There-
fore, it is necessary to identify the main drivers of synchronisation. Several factors such
as the trade intensity or the similarity of sectoral structures have already been taken into
consideration.
The goal of this paper is to take a step forward and look at the effects of labour market
institutions. More precisely, we focus on the influence which similar institutional condi-
tions and common structural reforms have on business cycle synchronisation. We build
our analysis on well-grounded theoretical implications about how institutions may influ-
ence an economy’s shock adoption and propagation mechanisms and, thus, business cycle
synchronisation. The econometric model is based on an unbalanced panel from 1979 to
2003 for 20 OECD countries, whereas the implementation of a robustness test is the core
of the econometric analysis. Since the labour market is influenced by a couple of different
institutional elements, this test is necessary to determine the relevant bilateral institutional
factors which indeed affect synchronisation. The main idea is to identify robust institutional
variables whose impact on synchronisation is insensitive to the variation of a set of control
variables.
Additionally to the impact of instantaneous reforms, delayed reforms are taken into account
in order to capture the effects of reforms which may need a longer time period to materialise.
The results show that several institutional indicators are significant and robust. Measures
for Institutional similarities concerning bargaining centralisation and coordination, as well
as labour taxes are important determinants for higher business cycle co-movement. Similar
to that, common structural reforms in terms of bargaining coordination, replacement rates
and labour taxes instantaneously reduce business cycle differences. In contrast, reforms
of bargaining centralisation and coordination, replacement rates and labour taxes show a
delayed impact.
Das Wichtigste in Ku¨rze
Die Analyse der Synchronisation von Konjunkturzyklen hat in den letzten Jahren haupt-
sa¨chlich aufgrund des laufenden Erweiterungsprozesses der Europa¨ischen Union an Be-
deutung gewonnen. In theoretischer Hinsicht gilt eine hohe Sychronisation der Konjunk-
turzyklen als eine wesentliche Voraussetzung fu¨r die Funktionsfa¨higkeit einer Wa¨hrungs-
union. Allerdings ist unklar, welche o¨konomischen oder politischen Anpassungen zu einer
ho¨heren Synchronisation fu¨hren und wie diese Anpassungen gestaltet sein sollten. Dies
erkla¨rt die Notwendigkeit, die wichtigsten Einflussfaktoren fu¨r Synchronisation zu identi-
fizieren. Verschiedene Komponenten wie die Handelsintensita¨t oder die A¨hnlichkeit der
sektoralen Struktur wurden bereits in Betracht gezogen.
Das Ziel dieses Beitrags ist, einen Schritt voranzugehen und die Effekte institutioneller Ar-
beitsmarktbedingungen zu untersuchen. Im Speziellen werden die Effekte der A¨hnlichkeit
institutioneller Bedingungen sowie gleichartiger Reformen auf die Synchronisation von Kon-
junkturzyklen untersucht. Unsere Analyse basiert auf fundierten theoretischen Implikatio-
nen, wie Institutionen die Aufnahme- und Weitergabemechanismen von Schocks und damit
die Konjunkturzyklensynchronisation beeinflussen. Das o¨konometrische Modell basiert auf
einem nicht ausbalanciertem Panel von 1979 bis 2003 fu¨r 20 OECD-La¨nder. Die Anwen-
dung eines Robustheitstests stellt dabei den Kern der o¨konometrischen Analyse dar. Da der
Arbeitsmarkt durch verschiedene institutionelle Elemente bestimmt wird, ist dieser Test
notwendig, um die maßgeblichen bilateralen institutionellen Faktoren zu bestimmen, die
tatsa¨chlich die Synchronisation mitbestimmen. Die zentrale Idee ist, robuste institutionelle
Variablen zu identifizieren, deren Wirkung auf die Synchronisation nicht durch die Ein-
beziehung verschiedener Kontrollvariablen beeinflusst wird.
Zusa¨tzlich zu der Wirkung von unverzo¨gerten Reformen werden diese verzo¨gert mit einbe-
zogen, um so ebenfalls Effekte von Reformen zu beru¨cksichtigen, deren Wirkung sich erst
nach einer la¨ngeren Zeitperiode entfaltet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass verschiedene institu-
tionelle Indikatoren signifikant und robust sind. Maße fu¨r a¨hnliche Bedingungen bezu¨glich
der Zentralisierung und Koordinierung der Lohnverhandlungen sowie der Steuern auf Arbeit
sind wichtige Determinanten fu¨r eine gro¨ßere A¨hnlichkeit der Zyklen. Gleichartige Refor-
men hinsichtlich der Koordinierung der Lohnverhandlungen, der Lohnersatzraten sowie der
Steuern auf Arbeit reduzieren Unterschiede zwischen Konjunkturzyklen. Die Reformierung
der Zentralisierung und Koordinierung der Lohnverhandlungen, der Lohnersatzraten sowie
der Steuern auf Arbeit zeigt dagegen eine verzo¨gerte Wirkung.
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1 Introduction
Business cycle synchronisation has been a frequently discussed topic in economics over the
last decade, prevalently in the context of currency areas. Synchronised business cycles are
likely to be an important prerequisite for the well-functioning of an optimal currency area
(OCA). An example for this issue is given in the following. A common monetary policy, as
it exists in a currency union, reduces the member countries’ flexibility to shocks. If mem-
bers of a currency area are in different business cycle positions, shocks probably require
different economic reactions making it challenging to find an appropriate monetary policy
adjustment for all members. Similar to this, candidate countries with less synchronised
cycles could boost their chances of admittance to the currency union by bringing their id-
iosyncratic cycle into line with the currency area cycle. However, it is rather unclear which
economic or political adjustments result in higher synchronisation, and which design the ad-
justments should exhibit. Therefore, a better understanding of the determinants of business
cycle synchronisation and their exact functioning has become a main goal for politicians of
both members of the European Monetary Union and aspirants for a membership since its
advent in 1999.
Starting with Frankel and Rose (1998), who firstly examined the relation between trade
intensity and business cycle synchronisation, there has been a growing literature on the
determinants of business cycle convergence over the last decade. Factors like bilateral trade
intensity, explained in more detail by e.g. Frankel and Rose (1998), and Gruben et al.
(2002), or the degree of specialisation as pointed out by e.g. Imbs (2004), and Garc´ıa Her-
rero and Ruiz (2008) are quite evident transmission channels and have been detected as
significant determinants in various studies for different specifications and frameworks. Simi-
larity in fiscal policy, although not analysed as comprehensively as trade and specialisation,
appears to be important for a stronger co-movement of output gaps. Some more explanation
on this relation can be found in, for example, Inklaar et al. (2005) or Darvas et al. (2005).
Similarity of labour market institutions has recently gained importance in empirical analyses,
mainly due to the availability of better data. Although studies on this topic predominantly
deal with the impact of labour market structures on employment or economic growth, in-
stitutional settings are also likely to play an important role for the degree of business cycle
synchronisation.
Our study extends the existing literature in several ways. We use an augmented set of struc-
tural indicators of institutional arrangements and implement a measure for the similarity
of structural reforms concerning these institutions. Thus, both the impacts of institutional
conditions and reforms are examined. Since reforms will need some time to materialise, we
also include lagged values of the reform measures. There are strong theoretical implications
about the impact of similar labour market structures on synchronisation. Nevertheless, it is
unclear which institutional factors indeed affect the co-movement of business cycles. Thus,
we analyse empirically whether the theoretical assumptions can be confirmed, and which
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institutions matter. In order to receive reliable results, two approaches to test robustness
are applied. In doing so, we examine the robustness of the effect of a variable by repeatedly
estimating its coefficient with a changing information set.
The study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents theoretical considerations and empir-
ical evidence on the determinants of business cycle synchronisation, while section 3 gives
a short overview of the dataset. Section 4 explains the underlying empirical methodology
including the structures of the robustness tests. The estimation results are presented in
section 5, while section 6 summarises the findings and concludes.
2 Theory and Empirical Evidence
From a theoretical point of view, business cycles are the consequence of common and idiosyn-
cratic shocks hitting a country. Business cycle synchronisation for any set of countries is
mainly driven by factors which influence a country’s shock adoption and propagation mech-
anisms, thus determining the resilience to macroeconomic shocks. Typically, variables like
trade intensity, the similarity of sectoral structures, fiscal or monetary policy are assumed
to influence the synchronisation of business cycles since these factors likely affect either the
adoption or the propagation of shocks. While the mentioned factors have been extensively
analysed in empirical studies, the role of labour market institutions is still unclear. In this
chapter, we confine attention to the theoretical arguments why labour market institutions
may influence business cycle synchronisation, and report earlier empirical findings on this
topic. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical aspects concerning variables which have al-
ready been identified as determinants of business cycle synchronisation are presented. These
variables are essential for our empirical analysis, since we include them as control variables.
2.1 Labour Market Institutions
Labour market institutions can affect the business cycle in various ways. Factors like the
workers’ bargaining power, employment protection legislation or the unemployment com-
pensation determine how shocks influence a country’s economic output. Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003) show that institutions which provide workers with a high bargaining power
are responsible for an inflexible labour market since wage adjustments are more difficult
to implement. Thus, the effects of shocks which, for example, increase a firm’s production
costs cannot be appropriately compensated via wage adjustments. This inflexibility could
give rise to price increases and a fall in aggregate demand. Besides, institutions may have an
impact on output fluctuations through their effect on the matching process. A high degree
of employment protection lowers a firm’s flexibility to respond to changes in aggregate de-
mand. Ljungqvist (2001) argues that unproductive workers (who would be laid off without
employment protection) remain in a firm. Particularly during an economic downturn, the
pressure of high firing costs forces firms to forego workforce adjustments as a reaction to,
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for example, a capacity under-utilisation. The additional wage payments to unproductive
workers reduce the firms’ room to manoeuvre and result in lower investments and higher
prices. Moreover, following the argumentation of Boeri and van Ours (2008), less workers
are hired in an economic upswing since firms include potential firing costs in their hiring
decision, leading to an inefficient and unproductive allocation of labour. The amount of
unemployment compensation may also affect the business cycle. Nickell and Layard (1999)
show that a high spending on unemployment compensation reduces the job search inten-
sity of the unemployed and, hence, labour supply. In this case, firms may not find enough
productive workers during an upswing or after a positive economic shock. Nevertheless, a
certain amount of unemployment compensation payment increases the probability that an
unemployed finds a productive job, as pointed out by Arpaia and Mourre (2005). Without
this transfer payment the unemployed would accept the first job offer which may be an
unproductive match. However, this neglects the worker’s opportunity to search on-the-job.
Hence, the negative effect of a low unemployment compensation on the worker productivity
is difficult to quantify. Overall, we do not claim that this overview is complete since fur-
ther connections between labour market institutions and the business cycle are conceivable.
Nevertheless, it delivers essential insights into the importance of institutions as a factor for
the evolution of business cycles.
These considerations have the following implications for business cycle synchronisation: If
countries have different labour market institutions, a common shock will lead to distinct
economic consequences, resulting in diverging business cycles. In the same vein, the shock
propagation mechanisms of two economies will be similar if they have comparable insti-
tutional arrangements. Nevertheless, common labour market structures may also lead to
diverging cycles caused by asymmetric shocks, especially in the presence of highly inflexible
labour market structures. High regulations concerning, for example, employment protection
may impede appropriate industry-specific or country-wide reactions to a shock. Asymmetric
shocks or different industry structures in the presence of common shocks may then result in
different output fluctuations. Furthermore, institutional reforms are aimed to raise the eco-
nomic flexibility and thereby a country’s resilience to idiosyncratic or asymmetric shocks. In
a monetary union this could compensate the inflexibility of the individual economies caused
by e.g. a common monetary policy through a strengthened idiosyncratic shock absorption
mechanism. Generally, we expect that similar reforms lead to higher synchronisation. How-
ever, this can only be true, if both countries’ reforms are competition-enhancing, thus raising
the countries’ ability to cushion shocks. In contrast, regulative reforms should decrease the
countries’ resilience to idiosyncratic or asymmetric shocks, consequently lowering the degree
of synchronisation.
Theoretically, the effects of similar labour market structures and reforms depend on whether
idiosyncratic or common shocks prevail, as well as whether the reforms which are carried out
are regulative or competition-promoting. Empirical results on this connection are scarcely
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available since only few studies concentrate on analysing the impact of institutional arrange-
ments in the labour market on business cycle synchronisation, while reforms have not been
analysed in this context up until now. Bo¨wer and Guillemineau (2006) use employment
protection legislation and union density as proxies for labour market flexibility and apply
an extreme-bounds analysis in a cross-section framework. Similar to this, Artis and Claeys
(2007) build their study upon a panel data set with employment protection legislation, union
density, benefit replacement ratio and the tax wedge as indicators for labour market flexi-
bility. None of the studies find a robust and significant effect of labour market structures
on business cycle co-movement. Both studies use the absolute differences of the indicator
values to account for differences in the institutional structures of two countries, but they do
not consider institutional reforms. Furthermore, we take advantage of a larger set of institu-
tional indicators and use a more systematic empirical approach to explain synchronisation.
While the role of labour market institutions for the degree of synchronisation is still an
open question, there is an extensive literature which has dealt with the identification of the
determinants of synchronisation. The factors which we describe in the following are taken
as control variables for our empirical analysis.
2.2 Control Variables
Basically, trade is assumed to be the main transmission channel for business cycles and a key
factor for higher co-movement. If, for example, the trade intensity between two countries
is high, an idiosyncratic shock affecting the first country likely spills over to the trading
partner, thus, influencing the countries’ business cycles in a similar way. This happens,
if the trade intensity is mainly driven by intra-industry trade. However, theory predicts
that higher trade intensity also leads to an increased industrial specialisation, resulting in
a larger fraction of inter-industry trade. Then, industry-specific shocks will not affect both
countries in the same way, resulting in diverging business cycles. Obviously, the theoretical
effects of trade intensity on synchronisation are ambiguous. In contrast to that, empirical
studies find a positive relationship between a high trade intensity and similar business cy-
cles. According to Frankel and Rose (1998), the overall effect of trade on business cycle
synchonisation is strong. These findings are supported by subsequent studies of Gruben et
al. (2002), Caldero´n et al. (2002) and Imbs (2004). Compared to the results of Frankel and
Rose (1998), however, their conclusions point to somewhat lower effects of trade, but still
support the view that trade intensity has a positive impact on business cycle synchronisa-
tion. The studies of Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and Bo¨wer and Guillemineau (2006)
find that trade is robustly connected with business cycle synchronisation and thus confirm
the view of Frankel and Rose (1998).
Fiscal policy may contribute to business cycle correlations as well. Fiscal divergence can be
the result of the reaction to idiosyncratic shocks which helps to keep together the business
cycles. In this case, fiscal policy works as an instrument of flexibility to increase an econ-
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omy’s resilience against idiosyncratic or asymmetric shocks. But fiscal convergence may also
foster synchronisation if common shocks are absorbed in a similar way by countries with
a common fiscal policy. Altough the fiscal policy mechanism is theoretically conflicting,
Darvas et al. (2005) provide empirical support of a positive impact of complementary fiscal
policies on synchronisation in a panel of OECD countries. In a similar vein, Akin (2007)
finds that similarity in bilateral fiscal policies fosters output synchronisation. Overall, the
recent literature suggests that similarity in fiscal policies has a positive effect on business
cycle synchronisation.
Similar to trade intensity, the theoretical considerations do not help to get a clear picture
about the role of a comparable sectoral structure. If two countries exhibit a similar sectoral
structure, shocks will affect both economies in a similar manner, while highly specialised
industries in the presence of common shocks cause business cycle divergence. If idiosyn-
cratic shocks prevail, the effect of a common sectoral structure on synchronisation highly
depends on whether these shocks spill over. Shocks which finally have an impact on both
countries result in higher synchronisation, while little shock spill-overs lead to diverging
business cycles. Empirically, convergence of business cycles is more likely to arise between
countries that have similar production structures. Otto et al. (2001) find that similar in-
dustry structures are positively correlated with output co-movement. However, the results
are not statistically significant. Likewise, both Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005) and Bo¨wer
and Guillemineau (2006) conclude that structural similarity goes in line with convergence,
although the outcome is weak. Furthermore, Imbs (2004) and Garc´ıa Herrero and Ruiz
(2008) find clear evidence that similar production structures tend to promote the synchro-
nisation of cycles.
Even the effects of a common monetary policy, often displayed by a currency union, on
synchronisation are not clear-cut. On the one hand, it contributes to more similar out-
put fluctuations by bringing into line the monetary policy reactions of different countries
facing the same shock. Furthermore, a common monetary policy promotes the trade in-
tensity inside a currency area by reducing the barriers to trade. However, it is unclear
whether inter-industry or intra-industry trade will gain importance. As already mentioned,
the trade characteristic determines the impact on synchronisation. Additionally, countries
lose a mean of flexibility to react to idiosyncratic or asymmetric shocks by submitting to
a common monetary policy, thus, the effect on synchronisation cannot easily be predicted.
Empirical studies on this relationship deliver contrary results. While Baxter and Koupar-
itsas (2005) as well as Clark and van Wincoop (2001) do not consider a currency union as
relevant for the determination of business cycle synchronisation, Frankel and Rose (2002)
report a significantly positive effect of a common currency for the similarity of business
cycles. They conclude that a currency union promotes the trade intensity inside a currency
area without observing a trade intensity decline with nonmembers.
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3 Data
The analysis of synchronisation between countries has to be based on the construction of
country pairs in order to capture differences between countries. We use an unbalanced
panel that covers 20 OECD countries, and makes a total of 190 country pairs. Such a panel
estimation requires a common time frame that conforms to the smallest available period.
Furthermore, developing a measure for business cycle synchronisation calls for the construc-
tion of periods of more than one year. Following the existing literature, periods of five
years length are specified. Therefore, we define that our time frame ranges from 1979 to
2003, since this is the least common period in terms of data availability. The underlying
data structure consists of five periods of five years each starting in 1979, such that the first
period covers the years from 1979 to 1983, while the second period goes from 1984 to 1988,
and so on.
The following variables are included in our empirical analysis. The endogenous variable
is represented by the output gap correlations over 5-year periods. Bilateral measures for
institutional similarity and the similarity of institutional reforms are the variables of inter-
est. Overall, we apply 19 indicators which cover five different policy fields of the labour
market. More specifically, indicators for employment protection (EP), union density (UD),
bargaining coordination and centralisation (BCO, BCE), replacement rates (RR) as well as
labour taxes (TX) are included. In the following, the measures for institutional similarity
will be denoted as ’distance’, while the bilateral reform indicators are called ’direction’.
Measures for trade intensity, similarity of fiscal policy and of sectoral structure as well as
a currency area dummy to capture the effect of a common monetary policy serve as con-
trol variables. For all explaining variables, we calculate the 5-year averages of the bilateral
measures to get variables which fit to the panel structure. All further technical details
and explanations concerning data sources and the construction of variables can be found in
Appendix 1.
4 Econometric Methodology
This section describes the econometric methodology to examine the impact of labour market
institutions and structural reforms on business cycle convergence and synchronisation. The
basic equation for our empirical analysis is the following panel regression model:
Y = α +Xβ + Zdisδdis + Zdirδdir + λ+ u. (1)
We specify a fixed effects model to control for time independent effects of each country.
Y represents the contemporaneous correlations of a country-pair’s business cycles for each
time period taken from the pool of 20 OECD countries. The business cycles are extracted
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by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to generate the correlations over the initially defined
5-year periods. X contains the variables trade intensity, sectoral structures, fiscal policy
and currency area as defined in Appendix 1. These control variables are included in each
regression. Zdis and Zdir are both sets of institutional variables, the former contains the
19 indicator differentials, the latter represents the 19 direction indicators which have po-
tentially significant explanatory power for business cycle convergence. The 38 indicators
for institutional similarity and common structural reforms build the indicator pool. Each
indicator is taken as the variable of interest while combinations of the remaining indicators
represent the information set. It is important to mention that the corresponding distance
and direction terms of an indicator are always estimated together. This is necessary due to
the fact that the mutual influence between a distance and direction measure is not clear-
cut, and leaving out one of them could lead to less reliable coefficients. Another important
restriction of the model is the ex ante exclusion of some indicator combinations. Indicators
which belong to the same institutional area are not jointly estimated. We proceed this
way in order to avoid a multicollinearity problem. Finally, α and λ capture cross-section
and period specific effects. The equations are estimated by using the standard fixed-effects
estimator.1
4.1 Extreme-Bounds Analysis
To identify the key reform factors on business cycle co-movement within the 20 OECD coun-
tries, we perform an extreme-bounds analysis. According to Leamer (1985), an extreme-
bounds analysis is an organised way of a sensitivity analysis, enabling the examination
whether the inferences about the variable of interest remain basically identical when chang-
ing its information set, thus, not depending on the inclusion of varying institutional indica-
tors. Applied to equation (1), Leamer’s approach proceeds as follows:
Y = α +Xβ + zdisγdis + zdirγdir + Zdisδdis + Zdirδdir + λ+ u (2)
zdir and zdis denote the variables of interest, the institutional variables, which are under ex-
amination of their robustness. The information set Z consists of all possible combinations of
up to three indicators (each with its corresponding distance and direction term) picked from
the complete indicator pool.2 The field of analysing business cycle synchronisation within
the framework of institutions and structural reforms is comparatively new. Hence, there is
considerable uncertainty about what variables of Z belong to the ’true’ regression model.
Since labour markets are influenced by several institutional factors, and theory gives no
1It has to be mentioned that the lack of valid instruments prevent us from taking into account the
possible endogeneity problem of our model by applying an instrumental variable estimation.
2In this case, Zdis and Zdir form the pool of all institutional indicators, except of the variable of interest
z.
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explicit guidance about which institutional aspects affect business cycle synchronisation we
have to rely on statistical robustness tests to find out which are the determining institutional
variables of synchronisation. Changing the conditioning variables, for example, can result
in conflicting effects concerning the impact of labour market institutions and reforms on the
correlation of business cycle between countries. On account of this, we have to run OLS
regressions in form of equation (2) for all possible combinations of one to three variables of
Z.3 Therefore, for each model two coefficients γˆdis/dir and their standard deviation σˆdis/dir
are generated. A variable is considered as robust when the coefficient remains significant
and the upper and lower extreme bounds have the same sign, where the upper extreme
bound is defined as:
UEB = γˆmax + 2σˆ(γˆmax) (3)
and the lower extreme bound:
LEB = γˆmin − 2σˆ(γˆmin) (4)
If the tested variable does not pass this criterion, it is regarded as ’fragile’, implying that no
reliable relationship could be identified and changes in the information set have a consider-
able impact on this variable. Consequently, it is not regarded as an essential determinant
in the basic model.
4.2 Alternative Approaches
The literature often characterises the criterion of Leamer as too strong and restrictive, with
the consequence that often almost no variable can be classified as robust. Sala-i-Martin
(1996) mentions that the Leamer suffers from the assumption that one regression for which
the coefficient changes its sign is enough to reject the robustness of a variable. This might
be a serious problem in particularly for large sets of variables of interest. Based on this
critique, there are several approaches described that provide alternative ways to relax the
criterion. Sala-i-Martin (1996) suggests alternative techniques to move away from this
extreme test. The basic idea is to take account of the whole distribution of a coefficient.
In order to determine the robustness of the variable, the fraction of the density function
lying on the right (left) side of zero is crucial. If more than 95% of the density for the
estimated parameters lies to the right (left) side of zero, then the variable is considered
3This is consistent with the existing literature, for example Levine and Renelt (1992), Sala-i-Martin
(1996) and Bo¨wer and Guillemineau (2006), who carry out the test of robustness with combinations of
three. To ensure comparability, we also present our results for up to three additional structural reform
distance and direction pairs.
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to be robust. Sala-i-Martin denotes the larger section as CDF(0), whereas CDF is the
Cumulative Distribution Function. Since zero divides the density into two, it is not of
importance, whether the larger share of coefficients is above or below zero. Hence, per
construction, the interval of the CDF is [0.5;1]. Due to the fact that the distribution of
the indicator coefficients might not follow a normal distribution, Sala-i-Martin constructs
two different cases. The first case is appropriate, when the mass of estimated coefficients
follow a normal distribution, whereas the second case should be used, when this assumption
fails. Furthermore, it is distinguished between a weighted and an unweighted approach.
Regressions, which are more likely to be close to the true model are given more weight. The
weighting scheme is based on the likelihoods of each regression to compute the weighted
average of the estimated coefficients as well as their variances. However, this methods
should not be applied when the goodness of fit might not be a good measure in order to
identify the ’true’ model (for a detailed description of the methods see Sala-i-Martin 1996
and 1997).
5 Results
5.1 Institutions and Structural Reforms
The first part of this section deals with the contemporaneous influences of institutional
similarity and structural reforms on business cycle convergence. The results of the robustness
tests are displayed in Table 1. The outcomes of three different robustness tests are presented.
Following the considerations of Section 4, we report robust variables using Leamer’s as well
as Sala-i-Martin’s approach. A variable is denoted as robust, if it passes the particular test.
According to Bo¨wer and Guillemineau (2006), we use a special form of quasi-robustness
for Leamer’s test. A variable is quasi-robust if the upper and lower extreme bounds have
distinct signs, but more than 95% of the variable’s estimated coefficients are significant. The
column ’variable’ displays the robust indicators, distance measures are above and direction
measures below the line. The further columns refer to Leamer’s and to Sala-i-Martin’s
methods, the latter split up into assuming first a normal (n), and secondly a non-normal
(nn) distribution, both calculated using weights (w).
We find a total of eight distance and four direction measures which pass at least one of the
robustness tests explained in section 4. Some of these variables are indicators for the same
instance, such that the relevant indicator groups are bargaining coordination, bargaining
centralisation, the employment tax rate and the tax wedge for institutional similarity, and
bargaining coordination, replacement rates and the direct tax rate for structural reforms.
The complete results for all included indicators can be found in Table 3 in Appendix 2. Note,
that only four variables are robust in terms of Leamer’s test. The considerably different
results between Leamer’s and Sala-i-Martin’s test can have two sources: the first test might
be too restrictive, or the restriction of the second test is insufficient. As explained in section
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Table 1: Tests of Robustness, contemporaneous effects
Variable Leamer Sala-i-Martin Sala-i-Martin
(n+w) (nn+w)
Institutional Similarity
(distance)
BCO1 quasi-robust robust robust
BCO2 fragile robust robust
BCO3 robust robust robust
BCO4 robust robust robust
BCE3 fragile robust robust
BCE4 fragile robust robust
TX3 fragile robust robust
TXW fragile robust robust
Institutional Change
(direction)
BCO3 fragile robust robust
BCO4 fragile robust robust
RR2 quasi-robust robust robust
TX2 fragile robust robust
Note: Column 3 contains results belonging to Extreme-Bounds Analysis. Columns 4-5 display results
belonging to Sala-i-Martin’s approach, whereas column 4 shows the normal, weighted case and column 5
the non-normal, weighted case.
4.2, we basically argue in favour of Sala-i-Martin’s test. However, we also report Leamer’s
results, since there is no formal evaluation which test is more reasonable. Leamer’s test
in this sense allows a further assessment of the reliability of the results. If a variable does
not pass both test procedures, we have to be even more careful in making final statements
about its importance. Sala-i-Martin (1997) proposes the likelihood weighting in order to add
weight to regressions which are more likely to be close to the true model. This weighting is
rather doubtful if used in an unbalanced panel framework as we do. A different amount of
observations probably influences the likelihood of a regression such that indicators with more
observations raise the goodness of a regression. Therefore, we also estimated the unweighted
CDF’s for both the normal and non-normal distributions. The correlations between the
different CDF values are also reported in Table 3, Appendix 2. The high correlations
between the normal and the non-normal as well as between the weighted and unweighted
CDF’s indicates, that both modifications do not change the results substantially. The above
described results draw upon the assumption that reforms have a somewhat immediate effect
on business cycle synchronisation. Furthermore, we conduct an extreme-bounds analysis
with lagged direction indicators in order to take account of the fact that reforms likely
need some time to materialise. Therefore, we slightly change equation (2) by replacing
all contemporaneous direction terms by the corresponding lagged direction terms. Similar
to Table 1, Table 2 presents lagged structural reform indicators which pass at least one
robustness test.
We do not report any distance indicators since including lagged variables lead to the omis-
sion of the first time period. Therefore, the robustness tests of the delayed model is less
reliable than the results of the contemporaneous model. Nevertheless, it should be men-
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Table 2: Tests of Robustness, delayed effects
Variable Leamer Sala-i-Martin Sala-i-Martin
(n+w) (nn+w)
Institutional Change
(direction)
BCO1 fragile robust robust
BCO2 fragile robust fragile
BCO3 fragile robust robust
BCO4 fragile robust robust
BCE1 fragile robust robust
BCE3 fragile robust fragile
BCE4 fragile robust fragile
RR3 fragile robust robust
TX1 fragile robust robust
TXW fragile robust robust
Note: Column 3 contains results belonging to Extreme-Bounds Analysis. Columns 4-5 display results
belonging to Sala-i-Martin’s approach, whereas column 4 shows the normal, weighted case and column 5
the non-normal, weighted case.
tioned that almost all distance indicators show quite similar results (see Tables 3 and 4).
The complete results of the delayed effects can be found in Table 4 in Appendix 2. The
findings displayed in Table 2 regard a total of ten delayed direction indicators as robustly af-
fecting business cycle synchronisation. More precisely, bargaining coordination, bargaining
centralisation, replacement rates, the employment tax rate and the tax wedge are identified
as robust determinants. However, it has to be pointed out, that a measure of bargaining
coordination (BCO2 ) and two of bargaining centralisation (BCE3, BCE4 ) are sensitive to
the choice of distribution scheme concerning Sala-i-Martin’s approach, since it changes from
robust to fragile (and the CDF values drop clearly) if the assumption of an underlying nor-
mal distribution is removed. It neither passes Leamer’s robustness test what indicates its
fragility.
5.2 Control Variables
Although the control variables trade intensity, sectoral structure and fiscal policy are not
a central element of our study, we report the results in order to find out whether the
level and direction of influence are in line with previous studies. Trade intensity has been
identified as a key determinant in various contributions. We find a positive linkage between
higher trade intensity and business cycle convergence. However, the effect is insignificant in
various specifications. This confirms the findings of Gruben et. al (2002) or Caldero´n et. al
(2002) who found a positive but not always significant effect of trade. Similar to this, the
influence of a similar fiscal policy in our model is also positive. In other words, two countries
with a similar fiscal policy are likely to have more synchronised business cycles, even if the
direction of causality is not necessarily unambiguous. This result is in line with Darvas et al.
(2005) and Akin (2007), who found a positive and significant impact of fiscal convergence
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on synchronisation. However, the significance of the fiscal policy coefficient in our model
depends largely on the chosen specification. Hence, our results concerning fiscal policy are
still convincing, but less clear-cut than the findings of Darvas et al. (2005) and Akin (2007).
In contrast to that, the role of a common sectoral structure is still unclear. The influence
seems to be positive, but the corresponding coefficient is insignificant in nearly all estimated
regressions. Hence the findings of earlier studies like Imbs (2004) or Garc´ıa Herrero and Ruiz
(2008), indicating a positive influence of similar sectoral structures, cannot unambiguously
be corroborated. Finally, the monetary policy dummy is insignificant in all specifications.
However, one has to keep in mind that an immediate effect of a common monetary policy
on business cycle synchronisation is an assumption which may not hold in reality. Thus,
the role of currency areas on synchronisation cannot be clarified without taking advantage
of a longer time frame.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Up to now, the whole empirical analysis was based on business cycles extracted by using the
HP-filter. Since different filtering methods can lead to distinct empirical results, we want
to check whether applying the Baxter-King (BK) band pass filter changes our findings.
Therefore, we repeat our analysis with correlations calculated on the basis of BK-filtered
business cycles. The results do not change substantially indicating the insensitivity of our
findings to the particular filtering method. The same indicators, both for distance and di-
rection, are identified as robust and have nearly the same CDF values. The upper and lower
extreme-bounds show a higher variation but the main conclusions remain unchanged. This is
consistent with other studies like e.g. Darvas et al. (2005) who also tested different business
cycle extraction methods with only slightly changing results. Furthermore, there is some
uncertainty about possible heteroskedasticity. Thus, we apply White’s heteroskedasticity
correction in our regressions, which controls for both cross-section as well as period specific
heteroskedasticity. Taking this into account does not change the results significantly. Serial
correlation is rather unlikely to occur due to our data transformation to 5-year averages and
to the small amount of available time periods. Finally, we extend our model to combinations
of up to four institutional variables additional to the indicator of interest in equation (2).
Thus, a total of 14 explaining variables are included in each regressions. Trade intensity,
Sectoral structure, fiscal and monetary policy are fixed, while combinations of four (and in
Leamer’s case up to four) indicators are picked from the pool of institutional variables. Yet
this extension does not cause any shift in the outcomes.
Further sensitivity tests depend on the outcomes of the robustness tests. Both the coeffi-
cient for sectoral structure and the monetary policy dummy are insignificant in all of the
regressions. Thus, we exclude them from the pool of control variables and repeat the ro-
bustness analyses. This modification causes no qualitative revision of the outcomes, neither
for the distance nor the direction terms. The exclusion of the sectoral structure variable
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permits the extension of the available time frame for the panel estimations. Thus, we build
5-year periods for an alternative time frame from 1970 to 2004. The same robustness tests
for this modified setup induces some new results, compared to the basic outcomes. Four
variables change from robust to fragile, while four other indicator terms now turn out to
be robust. We also note some changes for the lagged direction indicators. Two measures
lose importance, while two other variables become highly significant. The remaining results
qualitatively hold for the longer time frame from 1970 to 2004.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we seek to identify robust institutional variables influencing business cycle
synchronisation. Our focus lies both on differences in institutional arrangements as well
as in structural reforms. Therefore, we establish a bilateral measure for structural changes
and, in addition to the differences of institutional arrangements, analyse its contemporane-
ous and its lagged effect on business cycle convergence. Our results show that institutional
similarities concerning bargaining centralisation and coordination, the indirect tax rate as
well as the tax wedge are important determinants of higher co-movement. Similar to that,
common structural reforms in terms of bargaining coordination, replacement rates and the
direct tax rate instantaneously reduce business cycle differences. Reforms of bargaining
centralisation and coordination, replacement rates, the employment tax rate and the tax
wedge have a delayed impact since these changes likely need some time to materialise.
The findings indicate that institutional conditions and structural changes play an impor-
tant role for the determination of business cycle synchronisation. Countries with common
institutional settings are likely to react in the same way to a symmetric shock which in turn
leads to similar business cycles. Analogous to this, common reforms also tend to increase
business cycle convergence, probably through higher economic flexibility which increases a
country’s resilience to asymmetric shocks. Our results lead to the following considerations:
Since high synchronisation of business cycles is regarded as an important prerequisite for an
OCA, member countries as well as candidate countries should take into consideration that
bringing their institutional settings into line and synchronise their reforms could facilitate
a common monetary policy.
However, it has to be kept in mind that we made the assumption of institutions affecting
synchronisation, and not vice-versa. This leads to potential endogeneity in our model be-
cause closer business cycles may affect the similarity of institutional arrangements and the
reforms which countries carry out. We do not control for that as it is virtually impossible to
find appropriate instruments for institutions. Additionally, it is rather doubtful why some
measures of an institutional area like e.g. bargaining coordination are robust and some
measures of the same institutional factor are not. As a matter of fact, they account for
the same thing. This probably happens due to the difficult determination of comparable
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institutional indicators.
Furthermore, alternatively calculated periods somewhat change the results for some indica-
tors. Therefore, it should be kept in mind that we only observe a qualitative relationship
between structural indicators and business cycle synchronisation. Finally, the results ap-
plying Leamer’s robustness test are less significant. This could be caused by the strong
restrictions of the test. Moreover, the decision about robust and fragile is to a certain ex-
tent subjective. Thus, quantitative statements about the influence of particular indicators
as well as the exact identification of significant sub-indicators go beyond the scope of this
paper. Nevertheless, this study sheds light on the potential influence of labour market insti-
tutions on business cycle synchronisation and extends the existing literature by identifying
additional determinants of business cycle convergence.
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7 Appendix 1: Description of Data Sets
7.1 Institutional Indicators
The Nickell-Nunziata database (see Nickell and Nunziata (2001) as well as Nickell (2006))
delivers eight different groups of institutions for 20 OECD countries, where each group con-
tains several indicators. Not all indicators show a comprehensive data coverage in terms
of countries and periods. Therefore, we have to exclude some of them with insufficient
data availability for our study. The indicator areas that we use in our analysis refer to em-
ployment protection, union density, bargaining coordination and centralisation, replacement
rates and taxes. Additionally, indicators for which only limited data is available compared
to other indicators of the same group will not be incorporated in the following estimations.
The analysed group of institutional indicators consists of 19 different measures, each of them
linked to one of the aforementioned five institutional areas. A detailed description of the
complete database is given by Nickell and Nunziata (2001) and Nickell (2006), while the
institutional indicators, which have been taken into consideration for our own study, are
described in the following, sticking to the definitions given by Nickell (2006).
Table 3: Description of institutional variables
Variable Description Unit Range
EP1 Employment protection legislation data from the OECD labour market
statistics database using version 1 of the indicator: the strictness of
employment protection legislation.
index [0,2]
EP2 Employment protection legislation series taken from Allard (2005a).
This series uses the OECD methodology.
index [0,5]
UD1 Union density is Union membership/Employment and was calculated
using administrative and survey data from the OECD labour market
statistics database.
%
UD2 This series takes UD1 and extends it by splicing in data from Visser
(2006).
%
BCO1 This is a five year period index of bargaining coordination taken from
OECD (2004). It is increasing in the degree of coordination in the
bargaining process on the employers’ as well as the unions’ side.
Index [0,5]
BCO2 As BCO1 but interpolated taking the figure given in the table as the
middle number of the five year period.
Index [0,5]
BCO3 This is an index of bargaining coordination taken from Ochel (2000).
Based on data reported in OECD (1994), (1997), Traxler and Kittel
(2000), Wallerstein (1999), Windmuller et al. (1987) and Bamber and
Lansbury (1998).
Index [1,3]
BCO4 As BCO3 but interpolated. Index [1,3]
15
BCE1 This is an index of bargaining centralisation taken from OECD (2004)
Table 3.5. It is increasing in the degree of centralisation.
Index [0,5]
BCE2 As BCE1 but interpolated. Index [0,5]
BCE3 This is an index of bargaining centralisation taken from Ochel (2000). Index [1,3]
BCE4 As BCE3 but interpolated. Index [1,3]
RR1 Gross benefit replacement rates data are provided by OECD with one
observation every two years for each country. In this case the data refer
to the first year of unemployment benefits, averaged over three family
situations and two earnings levels. The benefits are a percentage of
average earnings before tax.
%
RR2 These are original benefit replacement rates data published by the
OECD. It is defined as the average across the first five years of unem-
ployment for three family situations and two money levels taken from
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives and interpolated.
%
RR3 Alternative series describing unemployment benefits by Gayle Allard.
The author develops a new indicator for unemployment benefits which
combines the amount of the subsidy with their tax treatment, their dura-
tion and the conditions that must be in order to collect them. See Allard
(2005b) for further details.
%
TX1 The employment tax rate is ESS/(IE-ESS) with ESS equal to employ-
ers’ social security contributions and IE equal to total compensation for
employees. ESS is available from the OECD National Accounts detailed
tables and IE from OECD Revenue Statistics.
%
TX2 The direct tax rate is DT/HCR with DT equal to income tax plus em-
ployees’ social security contributions and HCR equal to household cur-
rent receipts. Figures for income tax and employees’ social security con-
tributions were taken from OECD Revenue Statistics. HCR was taken
from OECD National Accounts directly for pre- 1990 and was calcu-
lated as the sum of compensation of employees, property income, social
contributions and benefits and other current transfers for post- 1990.
%
TX3 The indirect tax rate is (TX-SB)/CC with TX equal to indirect taxes,
SB equal to subsidies and CC household final expenditures. All three
were taken from OECD National Accounts.
%
TXW The Tax Wedge is equal to the sum of the employment tax rate, the
direct tax rate and the indirect tax rate.
%
7.2 Measuring Institutional Similarity and Institutional Change
Both a measure for institutional similarity as well as for institutional change are considered
in order to analyse whether institutions – and changes therein – have an influence on business
cycle synchronisation. This yields insights into the effects of both the institutional status
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quo and the conduct of structural reforms. First of all, an appropriate bilateral measure for
institutional similarity is required. We denote the indicators as P k. The index k ranges from
1 to 19, thus numbering the different indicators. Our measures for institutional similarity
are the absolute differences between countries in the levels of the particular indicators P k,
such that
Zkdis,ijt = −(|P kit − P kjt|), (5)
with P kit defined as the level of the particular indicator P
k of country i at time t. In doing so
we get 19 different bilateral indicators for institutional similarity between the countries, in
the following denoted as distance. Higher (lower) values of the Zkdis,ijt coefficient in the result
tables display more (less) similarity between the countries i and j. To measure institutional
change, the growth rates of each indicator P k are calculated for each country. Then the
absolute differences between countries in the growth rates of the particular indicators P k
represent the measure for the (dis)similarity of institutional change. This relationship can
be seen in the following expression
Zkdir,ijt = −(|gkPit − gkPjt |), (6)
where gkPit and g
k
Pjt
describe the growth rates of the particular indicator P k of countries i
and j at time t. The resulting term Zkdir,ijt is a bilateral variable measuring the relation
between an institutional change conducted in countries i and j. Overall, we can exploit a
total of 19 bilateral reform indicators. Higher (smaller) values of the Zkdir,ijt coefficients in
the result tables are linked to a stronger (weaker) similarity between the countries i and
j with respect to indicator P k. Henceforth, this measure for institutional change will be
called direction.
7.3 Business Cycle Synchronisation
Due to the fact that business cycles are not directly observable and measurable, an ap-
propriate methodology to estimate them is required. On the basis of the observable real
GDP series of the OECD for all 20 countries, the cycles can be calculated by filtering the
GDP series. There are quite a few possibilities for measuring the business cycle. De Haan,
Inklaar and Jong-a-Pin (2005) give a short insight into the differences between alterna-
tive filtering methods. They conclude that, ’studies that use standard filters such as the
Hodrick-Prescott, Baxter-King and Cristiano-Fitzgerald filters are likely to yield similar re-
sults’. Azevedo (2002) analyses several filters and justifies the application of the HP filter
in the context of extracting the business cycle. Thus, the commonly used HP filter with a λ
of 100 is applied in order to obtain the output gap as a measure of the stage in the business
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cycle. To take account of the existing uncertainty, a sensitivity analysis with the BK filter
as an alternative filtering method is conducted to check for the reliability of the results.
The cycle length of the filter is set at 3 to 8 years with a maximum lag length of 3 years.
The cycle measured by using the BK filter is introduced as a substitute for the HP-filtered
series, serving as a sensitivity test for the results obtained with the HP filter. The connec-
tion between the business cycles of two countries is made by calculating the corresponding
Pearson correlations over 5-year periods. In the following, the control variables included in
addition to the structural reform indicators will be described.
7.4 Trade Intensity
Trade is regarded as the major transmission channel for business cycles and a prime candi-
date variable for driving business cycle synchronisation. To account for the likely influence
of trade in this context, we construct an indicator of bilateral trade intensity, following the
approach of Frankel and Rose (1998), who defined a variable measuring the share of the
two countries’ bilateral trade flows in the total volume of their trade flows with all partner
countries. More formally, the variable is calculated as
tradeijt =
Xijt +Mijt
Xit +Mit +Xjt +Mjt
, (7)
Here, Xijt stands for the volume of exports from country i to country j during period
t and Mijt correspondingly stands for country i ’s imports of goods from country j. Xit
and Mit denote the volume of country i ’s total exports and imports in year t, respectively.
Annual data for bilateral and total trade volumes are taken from the IMF Direction of Trade
Statistics database and are measured in US dollar at current prices.
7.5 Sectoral Structures
To measure differences in sectoral specialisation of the production structure of two countries
the following variable is constructed
secijt =
S∑
s=1
|V ASsit − V ASsjt|, (8)
where secijt is the sum of the absolute differences of two countries i ’s and j ’s value-added
shares for each sector. These value-added shares V ASsit measure each sector’s relative
importance in the production structure of an economy and are calculated as
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V ASsit =
V Asit∑S
s˜=1 V As˜it
, (9)
This measure is a modification of the measure implemented by Krugman (1991) who used
sectoral employment shares rather than sector value-added shares. The data for sectoral
value-added are taken from the Industry Database of the Groningen Growth and Develop-
ment Centre (2006). This database provides annual data for 60 sectors covering all OECD
countries and thus enables a very detailed and disaggregated analysis of the sectoral differ-
ences. The use of such data is an improvement on studies such as Imbs (2006) who used
sectoral data of a higher degree of aggregation, or on studies using data not covering the
whole economy. For two countries with exactly the same production structure, secijt is
equal to 0, while it takes a value of 2 for two countries with completely disparate sectoral
structures. However, even in the large country sample there is no country pair with a value
exceeding 0.93 and the average value of secijt is 0.48. Considering that the sample comprises
mostly industrial countries, this relatively low degree of sectoral difference is not surprising.
7.6 Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy also seems to be a source for business cycle synchronisation. In our study,
we rely on the primary government net lending, measured as a percentage of GDP and
taken from the OECD database, to construct the bilateral fiscal policy variable. Taking the
absolute differences between countries i and j, the net lending value delivers a measure for
the similarity of the countries’ fiscal policies. In doing so, we follow Darvas et al. (2005),
who initially developed this approach to generate a bilateral measure for fiscal policy.
7.7 Currency Area
We construct a bilateral dummy variable as a measure for the similarity of monetary policy.
This dummy takes the value 1 if two countries are members of the same currency area.
Actually, the dummy captures the euro effect, since it takes the value 1 for countries of the
euro area for the last measured period from 1999 to 2003, and 0 else.
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8 Appendix 2: Result Tables
Table 4: Test of Robustness, contemporaneous effects, complete results
Leamer Sala-i-Martin
Variable UEB LEB Sign n+w n+uw nn+w nn+uw
Employment
Protection
EP1 dis −0.6607 0.6460 0.00 0.6076 0.5969 0.6062 0.5954
EP1 dir −2.2197 3.0578 0.00 0.5589 0.6069 0.5257 0.5711
EP2 dis −0.2695 0.1481 2.02 0.8508 0.8362 0.8221 0.8053
EP2 dir −0.6811 0.4981 0.00 0.6692 0.6631 0.6647 0.6584
Union Density
UD1 dis −0.0070 0.0150 4.37 0.8759 0.8834 0.8565 0.8623
UD1 dir −1.6516 5.2810 14.96 0.8370 0.8419 0.7872 0.7937
UD2 dis −0.0068 0.0149 4.37 0.8799 0.8865 0.8616 0.8667
UD2 dir −1.8285 5.0617 11.09 0.7997 0.8088 0.7506 0.7619
Bargaining
Coordination and
Centralisation
BCO1 dis −0.0104 0.2779 95.59 0.9935* 0.9942* 0.9901* 0.9910*
BCO1 dir −1.7447 1.3577 0.00 0.6650 0.6893 0.6397 0.6652
BCO2 dis −0.0147 0.2981 90.49 0.9921* 0.9930* 0.9883* 0.9894*
BCO2 dir −2.4595 1.4004 0.93 0.7797 0.7978 0.7276 0.7510
BCO3 dis 0.1343* 0.6191* 100.00* 1.0000* 1.0000* 1.0000* 1.0000*
BCO3 dir −0.1906 3.5132 87.70 0.9942* 0.9938* 0.9883* 0.9885*
BCO4 dis 0.0941* 0.5923* 100.00* 1.0000* 1.0000* 1.0000* 1.0000*
BCO4 dir −0.3320 4.2614 79.81 0.9911* 0.9907* 0.9843* 0.9846*
BCE1 dis −0.1356 0.2065 1.16 0.7216 0.7478 0.6682 0.6903
BCE1 dir −2.3464 2.3192 0.46 0.7295 0.6851 0.7033 0.6627
BCE2 dis −0.1475 0.2216 0.93 0.7012 0.7301 0.6464 0.6705
BCE2 dir −2.7740 2.2033 0.00 0.5785 0.5299 0.5956 0.5524
BCE3 dis −0.0980 0.3952 64.73 0.9809* 0.9811* 0.9654* 0.9659*
BCE3 dir −2.7268 2.6519 10.21 0.6629 0.6184 0.6189 0.5835
BCE4 dis −0.0964 0.4225 66.82 0.9829* 0.9829* 0.9674* 0.9679*
BCE4 dir −3.7120 2.6672 15.08 0.8397 0.8122 0.7586 0.7348
Replacement Rate
RR1 dis −0.0087 0.0033 0.40 0.8929 0.8937 0.8868 0.8871
RR1 dir −1.8141 0.5774 15.54 0.9188 0.9284 0.8960 0.9065
RR2 dis −0.0085 0.0164 3.59 0.8963 0.8922 0.8800 0.8753
RR2 dir −1.4651 0.1304 97.81 0.9979* 0.9979* 0.9963* 0.9963*
RR3 dis −0.0125 0.0146 0.00 0.5986 0.6031 0.5919 0.5958
RR3 dir −0.6088 0.6642 0.00 0.6040 0.6016 0.6017 0.5994
Taxes TX1 dis −0.0314 0.0110 6.15 0.8502 0.8523 0.8222 0.8240
TX1 dir −0.3829 0.9428 0.00 0.8852 0.8843 0.8784 0.8774
TX2 dis −0.0401 0.0433 0.00 0.6779 0.6703 0.6657 0.6583
TX2 dir −6.8803 1.4857 46.93 0.9739* 0.9766* 0.9500 0.9531*
TX3 dis −0.0063 0.0472 41.48 0.9771* 0.9801* 0.9669* 0.9691*
TX3 dir −1.8315 5.3487 19.13 0.9157 0.9251 0.8327 0.8492
TXW dis −0.0059 0.0261 69.13 0.9845* 0.9846* 0.9699* 0.9699*
TXW dir −5.3861 8.9073 25.56 0.9106 0.9098 0.8502 0.8493
Correlation (c=column)
Corr(c6,c8) 0.9877; Corr(c7,c9) 0.9884; Corr(c6,c7) 0.9921; Corr(c8,c9) 0.9935
Note: Column 3-5 contain results belonging to Extreme-Bounds Analysis; Column 3: Lower Extreme
Bound; Column 4: Upper Extreme Bound; Column 5: Fraction of Significance. Column 6-9 contain results
belonging to Sala-i-Martin’s approach, whereas column 6: normal,weighted ; 7: normal,unweighted; 8: non-
normal,weighted; 9: non-normal,unweighted. dis refers to distance, dir to direction.
* denotes a robust variable.
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Table 5: Test of Robustness, delayed effects, complete results
Leamer Sala-i-Martin
Variable UEB LEB Sign n+w n+uw nn+w nn+uw
Employment
Protection
EP1 dis −0.7067 0.8290 0.00 0.7860 0.7612 0.7758 0.7525
EP1 dir −2.5491 4.6702 46.89 0.9211 0.8634 0.7951 0.7371
EP2 dis −0.2182 0.2786 0.00 0.5771 0.6115 0.5631 0.5951
EP2 dir −0.5050 0.8183 0.00 0.7645 0.7864 0.7485 0.7706
Union Density
UD1 dis −0.0133 0.0188 0.67 0.6127 0.6287 0.5815 0.5979
UD1 dir −4.09649 4.7475 14.96 0.5817 0.5814 0.5557 0.5562
UD2 dis −0.0133 0.0185 0.50 0.6091 0.6232 0.5790 0.5937
UD2 dir −4.9617 4.7502 14.79 0.5814 0.5814 0.5556 0.5562
Bargaining
Coordination and
Centralisation
BCO1 dis −0.0926 0.3575 53.60 0.9736* 0.9758* 0.9507* 0.9513*
BCO1 dir −3.5111 0.7231 69.84 0.9985* 0.9968* 0.9804* 0.9762*
BCO2 dis −0.1274 0.3635 40.14 0.9573* 0.9607* 0.9182 0.9190
BCO2 dir −3.4338 1.2369 38.68 0.9824* 0.9738* 0.9190 0.9145
BCO3 dis 0.1836* 0.7689* 100.00 1.0000* 1.0000* 1.0000* 1.0000*
BCO3 dir −4.5501 0.6184 75.87 0.9974* 0.9957* 0.9817* 0.9800*
BCO4 dis 0.1227 0.7422 100.00 1.0000* 1.0000* 0.9999* 1.0000*
BCO4 dir −5.4031 1.1381 61.25 0.9937* 0.9904* 0.9684* 0.9661*
BCE1 dis −0.1875 0.4614 25.75 0.7394 0.8289 0.5735 0.6600
BCE1 dir −3.6236 1.1351 54.99 0.9830* 0.9744* 0.9612* 0.9505*
BCE2 dis −0.1857 0.4315 28.31 0.7320 0.8214 0.5678 0.6498
BCE2 dir −4.4155 1.7653 31.09 0.9460 0.9318 0.9137 0.8958
BCE3 dis −0.1877 0.5555 54.99 0.9679* 0.9699* 0.9420 0.9436
BCE3 dir −2.2603 4.2230 36.66 0.9575* 0.9085 0.7923 0.7349
BCE4 dis −0.2040 0.5626 53.36 0.9690* 0.9707* 0.9418 0.9423
BCE4 dir −2.4832 5.3913 38.52 0.9779* 0.9499 0.8410 0.7968
Replacement Rate
RR1 dis −0.0156 0.0038 50.60 0.9730* 0.9771* 0.9586* 0.9636*
RR1 dir −1.7891 1.1562 1.59 0.8249 0.7786 0.7855 0.7407
RR2 dis −0.0172 0.0193 1.99 0.7296 0.6839 0.7021 0.6600
RR2 dir −1.0945 0.5556 0.00 0.8269 0.8181 0.8165 0.8086
RR3 dis −0.0268 0.0175 0.00 0.6489 0.6928 0.6252 0.6660
RR3 dir −1.1161 0.2539 74.50 0.9837* 0.9835* 0.9734* 0.9737*
Taxes TX1 dis −0.0355 0.0151 0.00 0.7575 0.7626 0.7283 0.7321
TX1 dir −1.7602 0.2895 68.30 0.9797* 0.9796* 0.9767* 0.9765*
TX2 dis −0.0547 0.0442 0.00 0.5285 0.5388 0.5222 0.5311
TX2 dir −5.2468 4.7653 2.51 0.7765 0.7543 0.7521 0.7309
TX3 dis −0.0380 0.0355 0.00 0.5598 0.5689 0.5531 0.5620
TX3 dir −4.7638 2.6537 1.96 0.8088 0.8126 0.7815 0.7893
TXW dis 0.0014* 0.0410* 100.00 0.9993* 0.9993* 0.9989* 0.9989*
TXW dir −12.6176 1.7651 92.18 0.9960* 0.9961* 0.9913* 0.9914*
Correlation (c=column)
Corr(c6,c8) 0.9595; Corr(c7,c9) 0.9506; Corr(c6,c7) 0.9834; Corr(c8,c9) 0.9850
Note: Column 3-5 contain results belonging to Extreme-Bounds Analysis; Column 3: Lower Extreme
Bound; Column 4: Upper Extreme Bound; Column 5: Fraction of Significance. Column 6-9 contain results
belonging to Sala-i-Martin’s approach, whereas column 6: normal,weighted ; 7: normal,unweighted; 8: non-
normal,weighted; 9: non-normal,unweighted. dis refers to distance, dir to direction.
* denotes a robust variable.
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